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CONFUSING PUNISHMENT WITH CUSTODIAL CARE:
THE TROUBLESOME LEGACY OF ESTELLE v. GAMBLE
Philip M. Genty"
INTRODUCTION
For the better part of two centuries, imprisonment has been the
primary means of punishment for non-capital offenses in the United States.
A person, once convicted, is turned over to an institution that will regulate
every minute of her or his life. Yet, despite the central role that prisons
have long played in our society, the use of the Constitution to regulate
conditions of confinement in prisons is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Certainly, part of this has to do with the fact that constitutional litigation
did not begin in earnest until the "rediscovery" of the Civil War era civil
rights statutes in Monroe v. Pape. Still, Monroe v. Pape was decided in
1961, and it was not until 15 years later, in Estelle v. Gamble,2 that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment came to
be used as a tool for improving prison conditions.
Today, with federal court dockets full of cases alleging that conditions
of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment-particularly with respect
to overcrowding-it is easy to forget that, prior to Estelle, the Eighth
Amendment had been applied by the Court only to cases in which a mode
of punishment, usually a method of execution, was at issue. Estelle thus
redefined the constitutional concept of "punishment" by bringing the
protections of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause into the modern
prison.
Despite the noble goals of Estelle, however, the decision is
fundamentally flawed and has had a detrimental impact upon the very
prisoners it was intended to protect. The problems stem from-the Court's
failure to take sufficient account of the realities of the modern prison.
Imprisonment involves not only the fact and duration of confinement, but
also the conditions under which that confinement occurs. Prisons are
* Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Director, Prisoners and
Families Clinic. J.D. 1980, New York University School of Law. I am deeply indebted to Judith
Waksberg and David Leebron for their careful reading and thoughtful suggestions, which improved
this article immensely. I also wish to thank my colleagues, especially Michael Dorf, Kent Greenawalt,
Alan Hyde, Julia Spring, and Richard Uviller, during and after a presentation of this piece in the
Spring 1996 semester. I am grateful to my research assistant Charles Lee and to all of the students
in my Prisoners' Rights Seminar over the past few years who were instrumental in causing these ideas
to take shape. Support for this article was provided by Columbia University School of Law summer
research stipends.
1. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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literally miniature cities in which births, deaths, and even marriages occur.
Prisons have their own governing structure, police force, industries,
schools, medical facilities, housing complexes, and cemeteries.
Not all of these aspects of daily prison life fit comfortably within
notions of "punishment." Indeed, much of the daily routine of prison life
is virtually identical to that of other large, government-run, residential
institutions such as mental health hospitals and foster care facilities, neither
of which can be said to be in the business of "punishing" their residents.
Rather, prisons perform two separate functions, one that is punitive and
one that is custodial: prisons punish those they confine, and in this respect
they are unique, but, like other residential facilities, prisons also protect
and care for those within their custody. This article argues that the Estelle
Court erred in failing to distinguish between these punitive and custodial
functions and thereby merged two distinct constitutional concepts: the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, and
the substantive due process duty of care and protection owed to those
within government custody.
. As a result of the blurring of the distinction between punishment and
custodial care, the Court has struggled in the years since Estelle to develop
Eighth Amendment standards that can govern all aspects of prison life.
The Court's efforts have involved a tug-of-war between what the Court has
termed "subjective" and "objective" factors.' The former term has been
used to describe considerations that focus on the intent of the prison
administrators, employees, and guards who engage in the conduct or
impose the conditions complained of. The latter term has been used to
describe factors that relate to the impact upon the prisoner of the conduct
or conditions. While the pre-Estelle cases focused primarily upon issues
of impact, the Court has, in recent years, shifted to a primarily intent-
3. The use of the terms "subjective" and "objective" is somewhat misleading because of the
way in which those terms are used in tort law. There, the terms distinguish between a focus upon the
particular individual's motivations or actions under particular circumstances (subjectivity), and the idea
of a more general standard based on notions of what the "reasonable person" should know or how such
a person should act (objectivity).
In Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the Court explained that the "subjective" intent
standard for prison cases is, in fact, subjective, in that the relevant inquiry is "what a defendant's
mental attitude actually was (or is), rather than what it should have been (or should be)." Id. at 1980.
However, it is unclear whether an "objective" factor is to be evaluated under a "reasonable prisoner"
standard, or through an inquiry into the actual degree of suffering experienced by a particular prisoner
or group of prisoners.
It is probably most useful to avoid use of these terms altogether, because the relevant distinction
in Eighth Amendment cases is not so much between tort-law ideas of subjectivity and objectivity as
between the intent of the punisher and the impact upon the punished. For this reason, this article will
generally use the terms "intent-based" and "impact-based," rather than "subjective" and "objective."
[Vol. 21:379
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based Eighth Amendment analysis. Considerations of intent are useful in
determining when the custodial duty of care has been breached, but an
intent-based analysis is ill-suited for determining what amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment. The result of the attempt to fit all aspects of
incarceration into an intent-based framework has been an unwieldy and
unworkable set of contextual standards developed by an increasingly
fragmented Court.'
This article concludes that the standard for determining when
punishment is cruel and unusual should be impact-based, as it was in the
years preceding Estelle. However, in order to develop such a standard,
it is first necessary to untangle the strands of analysis in Estelle and to
separate those aspects of imprisonment that are "punitive," and therefore
subject to the Eighth Amendment, from those that are "custodial," and
therefore more appropriately analyzed as aspects of the substantive due
process duty of care. Those features which are unique to prisons and thus
properly considered to be "punitive" are the cell (and the cellblock) and
the prison guard, because it is the prisoner's relationship to these which
defines the experience of incarceration. Other features of imprisonment
are similar to those in other residential institutions and are, therefore,
custodial.
This article's discussion will proceed as follows. Section I contains
an historical review of the Court's early Eighth Amendment cases.
Section II discusses the modem cases, focusing on those involving issues
of double-celling: Rhodes v. Chapman5 and Wilson v. Seiter.6 Section III
4. These standards can be summarized as follows:
1. Medical care:
a. intent component: deliberate indifference;
b. impact component: serious medical need.
2. Conditions:
a. intent component: deliberate indifference;
b. impact component: deprivation that amounts to a denial of a minimal civilized measure
of life's necessities.
3. Excessive use of force, whether or not in the context of a prison disturbance:
a. intent component: whether officials or employees acted maliciously and sadistically for
the purpose of causing harm;
b. impact component: none. If subjective standard has been met, Eighth Amendment has
been violated, whether or not serious injuries have been suffered.
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1992).
This conceptual framework is a bit of a muddle, as even the Court seems tacitly to have
realized-no fewer than four opinions were written in the Hudson case. See Majority opinion of
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, Kennedy and Souter, 503 U.S. at 4-12; id. at 12-13 (Stevens,
J., concurring); id. at 13-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 17-29 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined
by Scalia, J.).
5. Rhodes v. Champman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
6. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
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discusses the inappropriateness of using an intent-based standard for
determining when prison conditions are cruel and unusual. Section IV
analyzes the Estelle decision. Finally, the concluding section proposes an
alternative analysis, which distinguishes between punitive and custodial
aspects of imprisonment.
I. THE EARLY EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASES
Prior to 1976, when Estelle was decided, the Supreme Court had
interpreted the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments in four principal cases: Wilkerson v. Utah, decided in 1878;"
In re Kemmler, in 1890;8 Weems v. United States, in 1910;9 and Trop v.
Dulles, in 1958. I0 As will be shown below, in each of these cases the
Court was concerned primarily with the way in which the punishment at
issue was experienced by the prisoner.
In Wilkerson, the Court was asked to decide whether execution by
shooting violated the Eighth Amendment." The Court, in examining the
history of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, noted that
prohibited punishments included those of torture "and all others in the
same line of unnecessary cruelty."" The Court gave, as historical
examples of prohibited punishments, those involving "circumstances of
terror, pain, or disgrace. "3 Specifically, the Court alluded to punishments
in which "the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of execution, in
treason; or where he was embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in
high treason. Mention is also made of public dissection in murder, and
burning alive in treason committed by a female."' 4 The Court determined
that death by shooting was not comparable to these extreme punishments
and was, therefore, constitutional.'5
In re Kemmler involved a challenge to the then-novel electric chair.' 6
The prisoner claimed, in essence, that the novelty of this mode of
execution, i.e., the unusual nature of the punishment, rendered it
7. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
8. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
9. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
10. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
11. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134-35.
12. Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 135.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 136.
16. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 441 (1890).
[Vol. 21:379
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unconstitutional." Again looking to the history of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court cited examples of the extreme types of punishments that were
prohibited-"burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or
the like"-and determined that death by electrocution was not such a
prohibited punishment.' 8 The Court's reasoning is fascinating in light of
current perceptions: the Court determined that the electric chair was
developed as a more humane method of execution. 9 In language that
would play a central role in later cases, the Court held that "[p]unishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. " 20 Because death
in the electric chair was, on the contrary, "instantaneous and therefore
painless," it was not cruel and satisfied constitutional requirements."
Weems involved Eighth Amendment issues related to disproportionate
sentencing.' A prisoner in the Philippines had been sentenced to 15 years
in irons under hard and painful labor for falsifying public records.' 3 As
in earlier cases, the Court conducted an historical inquiry, and examined
state court cases that had compared the relative barbarity and "odiousness"
of various types of punishment.24 The Court noted that interpretation of
the cruel and unusual punishments clause might evolve over time: "The
clause . . . may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice. "I In striking down the sentence as excessive, the
Court emphasized that punishment of "tormenting severity" is
constitutionally impermissible. 6
Finally, in Trop the Court dealt with the punishment of
denationalization.27 A military tribunal had, after a court martial, revoked
the appellant's United States citizenship because the appellant had escaped
17. See id.
18. Id. at 446.
19. See id. at 443. The development of the electric chair had resulted from a recommendation
by the Governor of New York, that scientific advances be used to find a less barbarous manner of
punishment than hanging, a product of the dark ages. See id. at 444.
20. Id. at 447 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say: "[Tlhe punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Id.
21. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
22. See Weems v. United States, 271 U.S. 349, 359 (1910).
23. See id. at 358, 364.
24. See id. at 377-78. Specifically, the Court discussed comparisons among whipping,
quartering, hanging in chains, and castration. See id.
25. Id. at 378 (citing Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427 (1885)); see also Mackin v. United
States, 117 U.S. 348, 350 (1886).
26. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 381.
27. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87 (1958).
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from a stockade and gone AWOL for one day .28 Tracing the history of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Court began by stating:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of [humanity]. While the State has the power to
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised
within the limits of civilized standards. . . . The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. 29
The Court then examined denationalization in light of these principles, and
found it to be a cruel and unusual form of punishment under the
circumstances of the case.3° In so doing, the Court focused entirely and
explicitly on the impact of the punishment:
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture.
There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in
organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than
torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was
centuries in the development .... It subjects the individual to a fate of
ever-increasing fear and distress. 31
Thus, whether discussing the "painlessness" of death by electrocution
or the profound despair of being rendered stateless, the Court in each of
the above cases focused its analysis upon the impact on the affected
individual. In none of these cases was the intent of the state actor a
relevant consideration.
The sole exception to this trend was Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, a quirky 1947 case.32 Even there, however, disagreements
about the amount of actual suffering involved probably played a significant
role in the outcome of the case. The facts of Resweber are uniquely
gruesome. The defendant had been sentenced to death by electrocution.33
He was put into the electric chair, the switch was pulled, but through some
malfunction he did not die. 34 He was removed from the chair and waited
through lengthy litigation to learn whether the state would be allowed to
28. See id.
29. Id. at 100-01.
30. See id. at 103.
31. Id. at 101-02 (footnotes omitted).
32. Louisiana ex. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
33. See id. at 460.
34. See id.
[Vol. 21:379
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try a second time to execute him." By a 4-1-4 vote, the Supreme Court
held that a second attempt would not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment and allowed the execution to proceed.36
A close reading of Justice Reed's opinion, which became the Opinion
of the Court by virtue of the Frankfurter concurrence, in conjunction with
the dissenting opinion of Justice Burton, reveals important disagreements
about the grisly factual question of how much electricity had actually
passed through the defendant's body.37 As with the other early Eighth
Amendment cases, then, a central issue in Resweber was the degree of
suffering experienced by the prisoner.
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, which provided the crucial
fifth vote for execution, is most often quoted when this case is discussed.
In contrast to the majority's approach, Justice Frankfurter plainly advanced
an intent-based standard, focusing on the accidental, unintentional nature
of the failure of the first attempt.
Thus, in the early cases involving modes of punishment, and with the
exception of Justice Frankfurters concurrence in Resweber, the Court
looked primarily at the way in which the punishment at issue was
experienced by the prisoner to determine whether the punishment was
35. See id. at 461.
36. See id. at 466.
37. The State had alleged that no electrical current had reached his body, that his flesh did not
show any signs of electrical bums, and that the electric current had "tickled him." See id. at 480-81
n.2. The Reed opinion apparently accepted this representation in concluding:
The situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is just as though he had suffered
the identical amount of mental anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such
as, for example, a fire in a cell block. We cannot agree that the hardship imposed upon
the petitioner rises to that level of hardship denounced as denial of due process because
of cruelty.
Id. at 464. The four Justices found no constitutional violation, apparently concluding that the
defendant's degree of actual suffering had not been excessive because only a minimal electrical current
was used, such that the harm to the defendant was merely psychological (i.e., the anxiety of awaiting
a second attempt at execution). See id.
It was with this factual analysis of suffering that the dissenting Justices took issue. The
defendant's pleadings had painted a much different picture: "Then the electrocutioner turned on the
switch and when he did Willie Francis' lips puffed out and he groaned and jumped so that the chair
came off the floor. Apparently the switch was turned on twice and then the condemned man yelled:
'Take it off. Let me breath [sic].'" Id. at 480 n.2.
The dissenting Justices explicitly rejected the notion that intent of the administration was the
relevant consideration: "Lack of intent that the first application be less than fatal is not material. The
intent of the executioner cannot lessen the torture or excuse the result." Id. at 477. The dissenters
compared the experience of repeated attempts at electrocution to that of being burned at the stake. See
id. at 476. In light of this factual dispute about the amount of electricity that had passed through the
defendant's body and the degree to which he had suffered, the dissenters urged that the case be
remanded for a determination of the issue. See id. at 480-81.
38. See id. at 466-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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cruel and unusual. In contrast, in the more recent cases involving
conditions of imprisonment, the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis has
become almost entirely intent-based. This shift in the Court's analysis is
discussed in the following section.
II. THE MODERN CASES
The evolution in the Court's approach to Eighth Amendment
conditions cases is best understood by examining two cases dealing with
double-celling of prisoners: Rhodes v. Chapman and Wilson v. Seiter.39
In Rhodes, the Court used a primarily impact-based test to determine
whether the double-ceiling of prisoners violated the Eighth Amendment. 4°
The Court's opinion centered on the degree of discomfort caused by
double-ceiling and characterized earlier cases as teaching that the Eighth
Amendment is violated when prisoners are deprived of "the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities. 4 In applying this principle, Justice
Powell rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the expert opinions and studies
introduced at trial provided the relevant Eighth Amendment "standards of
decency." '42 Terming the opinions and studies merely "goals" suggested
by the individuals and organizations offering them, rather than
"constitutional minima," Justice Powell concluded that "generalized
opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily in determining contemporary
39. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
The Court had addressed the application of the Eighth Amendment to specific conditions of
confinement in an earlier case, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Hutto was merely the
concluding episode of a long series of skirmishes in the lower courts. See id. at 681 n.2. The
litigation had involved broad challenges to a number of conditions in the Arkansas state prison system,
including punitive segregation. See id. at 682. In punitive segregation, anywhere from four to eleven
prisoners were confined to single cells measuring eight feet by ten feet, with no furniture and a toilet
that was controlled from outside the cell. See id. Mattresses were thrown randomly on the floor at
night, and were not disinfected after use. See id. Prisoners so confined existed on a diet of "grue,"
a baked mixture of various ingredients providing only 1,000 calories per day. See id. at 683.
Prisoners were sometimes confined to punitive segregation for months. See id. at 684. The district
court had limited the number of prisoners who could be confined to a cell, ordered an end to the
"gne" diet, and imposed a 30 day maximum on the duration of punitive confinement. See id. at 684.
By the time the case reached the Court, only the 30 day limit was at issue. See id. at 680.
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens stated that, in evaluating conditions of confinement under
the Eighth Amendment, the conditions must be taken as a whole, rather than looked at individually.
See id. at 687. Whether the conditions were cruel and unusual depended upon the nature of the
conditions and their duration. Noting that a 30 day maximum would not be constitutionally required
in every case, Justice Stevens stated: "A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 'grue' might be
tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months." Id. at 686-87.
40. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348.
41. Id. at 347.
42. See id. at 347.
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standards of decency as 'the public attitude toward a given sanction.'
Justice Powell concluded that the hardships caused by double-ceiling did
not violate these standards.'
While agreeing that the relevant Eighth Amendment standard was one
that focused on the impact upon the prisoner, Justice Brennan (in
concurrence), and Justice Marshall (in dissent) adopted approaches
different from that of Justice Powell. Justice Brennan suggested that a
court must look at the "totality of the circumstances," adding, "[e]ven if
no single condition of confinement would be unconstitutional in itself,
'exposure to the cumulative effect of prison conditions may subject inmates
to cruel and unusual punishment."' 45 Applying this test, Justice Brennan
concluded that the prison at issue was "one of the better, more humane
large prisons in the nation," and therefore concurred in the judgment that
the conditions were not unconstitutional.'
Justice Marshall would instead have relied upon the expert testimony
and studies presented at trial indicating that long-term prisoners must each
have at least 50 square feet of cell floor space to avoid serious mental,
emotional, and physical deterioration.47 Because the double-celled inmates
had far less cell floor space than required under these standards, Justice
Marshall would have found that the Eighth Amendment had been
violated.48
The Court revisited the issue of double-ceiling 10 years later in
Wilson v. Seiter.49 To decide that case, the Court developed a primarily
43. Id. at 348-49 n.13.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-23 (D.N.H. 1977)).
According to Justice Brennan, the Court must determine whether "the cumulative impact of the
conditions of incarceration threatens the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the
inmates and/or creates a probability of recidivism and future incarceration." Id. at 364 (quoting
Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 323) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 366-67.
47. See id. at 371 n.4. Reports cited at trial included: AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N, STANDARD
FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1976); COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION FOR
CORRECTIONS, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1977); NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS (1980); NAT'L SHERIFFS' ASS'N, A HANDBOOK ON
JAIL ARCHITECTURE (1975); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAILS
(1980); NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
OF PRISONERS (1972).
48. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 374-75.
49. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). Like Rhodes, Wilson involved a challenge to
overall conditions of confinement. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296. The conditions at issue in Wilson
were, in addition to double-ceiling, the following: "overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker
storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate rest
rooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill
inmates." See id.
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intent-based analysis, and, in so doing, abandoned the approach of Rhodes.
Although the Court held that the Eighth Amendment included both intent-
based ("subjective") and impact-based ("objective") components, the
Court's analysis focused on whether the conditions of confinement at issue
were imposed with punitive intent.5° The Court reasoned that, when the
conditions at issue are not part of the actual punishment "meted out...
by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be
attributed to the inflicting officer before it [the condition] can qualify [as
punishment]. "51 A showing of punitive intent is, therefore, necessary to
make conditions of confinement amount to "punishment.""
While acknowledging that the "holding in Rhodes turned on the
objective component of an Eighth Amendment prison claim (Was the
deprivation sufficiently serious?)," Justice Scalia concluded that the Rhodes
Court simply did not reach the issue of intent, because that component was
not necessary to the Court's holding.53 Justice Scalia's statements to the
50. See id. at 300.
51. Id. The Court had used similar reasoning in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), a case
involving conditions of pre-trial detention, including double-ceiling. Reasoning that the Eighth
Amendment applies only to persons who have been convicted of crimes, because only they may legally
be punished, the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to pre-trial detainees.
See id. at 535 n.16.
In order to establish a substantive due process violation a detainee must show that the condition
at issue amounts to punishment. See id. at 538. This requires proof that the jailer intended to punish
the detainee. See id. Such intent may be established explicitly through the government's expressed
intent to punish or may be inferred from conditions that are not "reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective" and are therefore "arbitrary or purposeless." See id. at 539.
52. It remained for the Court to determine what degree of intent had to be proven. While the
Court in Estelle had adopted a standard of "deliberate indifference" for cases involving denial of
medical care, see infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text, in a later case, Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312 (1986), involving allegations of excessive force, the Court had articulated a higher standard.
In Whitley, the plaintiff had sustained serious permanent injuries when he was shot in the knee
by a guard in the aftermath of a prison disturbance. See id. at 316. Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court, concluded that Estelle's recklessness standard of "deliberate indifference" was inappropriate to
the crisis situation of a prison disturbance and instead adopted a standard of specific intent: "whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm." Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In Wilson, Justice Scalia concluded that the appropriate level of intent for cases in which
conditions are challenged is the "deliberate indifference" standard of Estelle, rather than the higher
Whitley standard. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03.
53. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. This conclusion appears disingenuous, however, given that
nothing was said about an intent component in any of the opinions in Rhodes. One assumes that, in
deciding Rhodes, the Supreme Court would have articulated the entire legal standard before applying
it to the facts before it. In other words, if the Rhodes Court had believed that there was an intent
component to an Eighth Amendment claim, it is likely that the Court, or one of the concurring or
dissenting Justices, would have said something about that component, even to the extent of
acknowledging that it was not at issue in the case before it.
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contrary notwithstanding, this imposition of an intent requirement marked
a significant departure from Rhodes.
A final gloss on this emerging, intent-based analysis was applied in
Hudson v. McMillian, a case involving a prisoner's allegation that he had
been beaten by guards. 4 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
essentially eliminated the impact-based component altogether for
allegations of excessive force. Justice O'Connor first held that the
applicable intent standard in such cases is "whether force was applied in
a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."55 Justice O'Connor
then concluded that societal standards of decency-and therefore the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments-are violated
whenever prison guards have applied force with sadistic or malicious
intent, regardless of whether the guards' actions have caused serious injury
to the prisoners. 6
In addition to setting out intent requirements for prison conditions cases, the Court in Wilson
modified the requirements concerning impact upon the prisoner. See id. at 304. Justice Scalia rejected
the "totality of circumstances" standard urged by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Rhodes
and held that whenever prison conditions are challenged, at least one of the conditions must, by itself,
amount to a deprivation of a basic life necessity. See id. Conditions which alone are insufficient to
satisfy the objective test cannot be aggregated, except in very rare situations in which the conditions
at issue were "mutually reinforcing." See id. Examples of conditions that may be aggregated are a
lack of heat combined with a shortage of blankets, or lack of opportunity for exercise combined with
small cell size. See id. at 304-05.
54. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
55. Id. at 6 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)) (intemal quotation marks
omitted). Despite the absence of the dangerous and fluid prison uprising present in Whitley, Justice
O'Connor concluded that a situation necessitating the use of force requires a similar degree of hasty
judgment, and that the heightened specific intent standard is therefore appropriate. See id. at 6-7. The
Court divided 5-4 on this issue. Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun wrote opinions concurring in
the majority's holding with respect to the impact component, but dissenting from the holding with
respect to the intent component. See id. 12-17. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote an
opinion dissenting on both issues. See id. at 17-29.
56. See id. at 6-7. Justice O'Connor's approach differed from that of previous cases. Whereas
previous decisions had focused upon "contemporary standards of decency" only in the context of
assessing the impact-based aspects of a prisoner's claim, i.e., the injuries or conditions complained of,
Justice O'Connor held that the conduct or intent of prison employees may also violate societal
standards. See id. at 9.
Applying this analysis, Justice O'Connor went on to rationalize previous decisions in light of this
contextual approach. See id. at 7-10. With respect to prison conditions, "society" believes that
"routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders [must] pay." Id. at 9 (quoting Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, only
deprivations that deny prisoners a minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are actionable. See
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Similarly, with respect to medical care, "society" does not expect prisoners
to have "unqualified access;" their unmet needs must be "serious" to be actionable under the Eighth
Amendment. See id.
Vermont Law Review
The Hudson case marked the Court's complete break with the older
Eighth Amendment cases. Prior to Wilson and Hudson, the Court had
been concerned with the prisoners' experiences of punishment. After
Wilson and Hudson, impact-based considerations are, at most, of
secondary importance. That the intent-based factors are currently the more
important is shown vividly by the fact that, after Hudson, intent alone may
give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, while even the most dreadful
conditions are apparently not sufficient unless accompanied by the requisite
intent.
As discussed in the following section, the Court's move-to an intent-
based standard is entirely inappropriate to Eighth Amendment cases
involving prison conditions. In addition, the theoretical premise
underlying this shift-that an "intent to punish" is required because prison
conditions are not part of the "punishment" formally imposed upon a
prisoner-is mistaken.
III. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN INTENT-BASED STANDARDS
The Court's shift to an analysis which focuses on the motivations of
correctional actors in prison condition cases is problematic in at least three
respects: first, the theoretical premise upon which the imposition of an
intent requirement is based is wrong; second, an intent-based standard is
unworkable in cases involving challenges to conditions of confinement;
and, third, the use of an intent-based standard is inherently weighted
against prisoners.
With respect to the theoretical justification underlying the imposition
of an intent-based standard, the Court's analysis in Wilson was based on
a perceived distinction between sanctions that are imposed as
"punishment" by the sentencing court or by statute, and conditions of
imprisonment which, according to the Court, are not formally imposed as
punishment. This distinction is, however, artificial and historically
invalid. Imprisonment has been the dominant mode of punishment in the
United States for almost 200 years,57 so it would be difficult to argue
seriously that incarceration is not "punishment." Nonetheless, Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court in Wilson, and Justice Thomas, writing in
dissent in Hudson, asserted that the substance of imprisonment, i.e., the
57. See HENRY ELMER BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT 120-44 (2d ed. 1972). Barnes
traces the origin of the penitentiary in the United States to the conversion of the Walnut Street Jail in
Philadelphia between 1790 and 1.794, and the erection of the Newgate Prison in New York City
between 1796 and 1797. See id. at 129-33. Prisons came into use in other states during the first half
of the nineteenth century. See id. at 138-39.
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details that form the day-to-day reality of prison life, are not "punishment"
because neither criminal statutes nor sentencing courts have explicitly
imposed these conditions of confinement.
The reasoning of Justices Scalia and Thomas appears to depend on a
distinction between sanctions imposed by the judicial or legislative branch
and conditions imposed by the executive branch through the administrative
agencies charged with running the nation's prisons. There is certainly a
clear division of responsibility among these branches. The legislatures set
the sentences that can be imposed for enumerated crimes and allocate the
money for building and maintaining prisons. The courts, in turn,
determine what sentence, within the legislatively permissible range, will
be imposed in a given case. The legislatures and courts therefore
determine who will be imprisoned and for how long. However,
administrative agencies design and locate the prisons, develop the
classification and disciplinary schemes, and assign the prisoners to
particular prisons. In short, it is the agencies that determine where the
prisoners will spend their time and what will happen to them while they
are incarcerated.
Thus, the Scalia/Thomas analysis amounts to the conclusion that the
government "punishes" prisoners when it determines the fact or duration
of imprisonment, but not when it establishes the conditions of that
confinement. There is no apparent jurisprudential basis for making the
definition of "punishment" depend on whether the action at issue is
legislative or judicial, on the one hand, or administrative, on the other.
The government's carrying out of "punishment" surely extends beyond the
moment of sentencing, regardless of the fact that it is an administrative
agency that is exercising power over the prisoner.
Moreover, this supposed distinction ignores the reality of correctional
policy in the United States. Legislatures and courts envision a certain
package of disabilities when they enact criminal statutes or impose
sentences. As the Court itself has recognized, the legislators and judges,
acting as the voice of the people who have selected .them, have certain
negative expectations about prison: they want and expect prison to be an
unpleasant place.58 In the eyes of the legislators, judges, and the public,
punishment is more than the simple deprivation of liberty; our society
thinks of "imprisonment" as a bundle of punitive "things." We expect
58. As Justice Powell noted in Rhodes,
To the extent that such [prison] conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. . . . Mhe
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons. . . which house persons
convicted of serious crimes cannot be free of discomfort.
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 349.
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that there will be different sorts of prisons with the "worst" offenders
being assigned to the harshest penological environments. We expect that
there will be solitary confinement for those who commit disciplinary
infractions, and we probably also expect that prisons will be ruled by fear
and intimidation. Government-imposed punishment therefore encompasses
more than the mere fact or duration of confinement; it involves the quality
of that confinement as well.
In short, the fact that an administrative agency, rather than the
legislature or the judiciary, carries out the function of imposing a certain
set of conditions upon the offender is irrelevant to the question of whether
those conditions amount to "punishment." The reality is that, within any
jurisdiction, there is a single government system of "punishment," the
responsibility for which is divided among the three branches of
government. This division of responsibility among the three branches
cannot plausibly be the basis for defining what constitutes "punishment"
under the Eighth Amendment.59 However, this is precisely the distinction
upon which the Court's analysis in Wilson depends and, as such, the
Wilson analysis is unsound.'
The second problem with the use of an intent-based standard in Eighth
Amendment cases involving conditions of confinement is that such a test
does not work in these cases. Because of the difficulty of assessing intent
in cases challenging system-wide prison conditions, an intent-based
standard fails in the very cases that are most often litigated under the
Eighth Amendment. Justice White made this point in his concurring
opinion in Wilson:
Not only is the majority's intent requirement a departure from
precedent, it likely will prove impossible to apply in many cases.
Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of cumulative actions
and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison,
59. For a further discussion of the shared responsibility for imposing punishment among the
three branches of government, see Thomas K. Landry, Punishment and the Eighth Amendment, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. at 45-54 (forthcoming 1996).
60. Justice Scalia's analysis fares no better from an historical perspective. The distinction that
Justice Scalia suggests-that conditions of confinement cannot amount to punishment in the absence
of a showing of intent to punish-has no basis in precedent. As discussed in Section I, supra, the
Court's older cases involving modes of punishment focused on the impact of the punishment upon the
offender, without any suggestion that intent to punish was a relevant consideration. Even the cases
upon which Justice Scalia purported to rely-Resweber and Estelle-fail to support his approach.
Neither of these cases attempted to define "punishment," let alone suggest a distinction based upon
intent to punish. In particular in Estelle, Justice Marshall appeared to take as a given that medical care
is an aspect of "punishment" regardless of the intent of the prison administration, and despite the fact
that specific medical care requirements are not "meted out" by the sentencing courts or the legislatures.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1976).
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sometimes over a long period of time. In those circumstances, it is far
from clear whose intent should be examined, and the majority offers no
real guidance on this issue. In truth, intent simply is not very
meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a
prison system.
The majority's approach also is unwise. It leaves open the
possibility, for example, that prison officials will be able to defeat a §
1983 action challenging inhumane prison conditions simply by showing
that the conditions are caused by insufficient funding from the state
legislature rather than by any deliberate indifference on the part of the
prison officials.6'
The intent-driven model therefore does not fit the factual context of most
Eighth Amendment cases.
In addition, an intent-based standard fails to reach some of the most
important issues that may arise in a prison setting. Except in those
extreme situations involving sadistic behavior on the part of prison guards,
the most serious problems in prison probably have relatively little to do
with the intent of the prison officials. Rather, it is the conditions
themselves that are of concern. Intolerable conditions are made no less so
by a lack of actionable intent on the part of prison officials. As Justice
Stevens has observed in other contexts, the use of dungeons, chains, and
shackles might satisfy an intent-based test if prison officials could simply
offer a good-faith justification based on the need to maintain security with
fewer prison guards,62 and the use of bullwhips might similarly be justified
by arguing that it improves prison discipline.63 A standard focusing
primarily on the motivations of the prison administration may, therefore,
fail to remedy even those conditions widely viewed as intolerable.
Beyond these criticisms, however, the final and, perhaps, most
fundamental problem with the Court's approach is that a primarily intent-
based standard can never be an adequate or accurate measure of the nature
of the punishment at issue. This is so because an intent-based standard
is inherently weighted against prisoners. While an impact-based standard
61. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310-1 (1991) (footnotes omitted). Justice Blackmun
registered similar objections in his concurring opinion in Farmer. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct.
1970, 1986 (1994).
For similar observations and criticisms, see Ruthanne DeWolfe, The View from Inside the Heads
of Correctional Officials: The Legacy of Resweber, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1007, 1007-18 (Jan. 1993).
62. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 587-88 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Bell involved
conditions of pre-trial detention. See id. at 530. It was decided as a substantive due process case
under the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. See id.




sees prison conditions through the eyes of the prisoner, an intent-based
standard sees these same conditions through the eyes of the prison
administration and guards. Framing the inquiry from the vantage point of
the prison administration and guards makes it unlikely that claims of
prisoners about conditions of confinement can ever be fairly considered.
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to consider the
practicalities of prison litigation. Representation of prisoners is
exceedingly difficult because prisoners are, by definition, probably the
most despised client population. Prisoners are the "other": they are
condemned; sent to remote rural locations; hidden from view; and
forgotten. Indeed, if we are honest about what "society" really thinks of
prisoners, it is likely that a significant portion of society is indifferent or
actively opposed to prisoners and willing to write them off entirely.
The situation is further complicated by the marked disparity between
the racial, ethnic, and economic makeup of prisoner populations and that
of the "society" that is responsible for trying and deciding prison cases.'
In these demographic respects the lawyers, judges, and jurors involved in
prison cases will generally resemble the other "society" involved in Eighth
Amendment litigation: that of prison administrators and guards .6S Given
this disparity, for a lawyer representing a prisoner there is an initial
challenge in simply getting the other actors in the legal system to care
enough about the client to entertain the possibility that important rights
have been violated. To an extent unknown in other contexts, a case
involving the rights of a prisoner requires both judge and jury to overcome
their sense of the prisoner's "otherness" before the prisoner's claims can
be fairly considered.
Where the Eighth Amendment standard focuses upon the experience
of the imprisoned, there is at least a chance that the prisoner's claims may
be fairly considered. Focusing on the impact upon the prisoner of prison
64. Prisons are disproportionately populated by people of color. In 1990, Blacks and Hispanics
constituted almost 60 percent of the United States prison population. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1990,
Table 3, "Number of Inmates/residents in State and Federal correctional facilities by race, Hispanic
origin, jurisdiction and region, June 29, 1990" (1990). Out of a total federal and state prison
population of 715,649, 331,880 of the prisoners were Black non-Hispanic and 95,498 were Hispanic.
See id. 274,929 of the prisoners-39 percent-were White non-Hispanic. See id. There were also
6,471 prisoners of American Indian or Alaska Native origin and 6,871 of Asian or Pacific Islander
origin. See id.
65. In contrast to the demographic statistics for prisoner populations cited in the preceding note,
almost three-fourths of the correctional employees were White. See id., Table 23, "Total payroll staff
in State and Federal correctional facilities, by sex and race/Hispanic origin, June 29, 1990." Of
253,397 total payroll staff, 187,093 were White non-Hispanic, 49,226 were Black non-Hispanic,
13,148 were Hispanic, and 3,930 were of other backgrounds. See id.
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conditions and guard conduct forces a judge or juror to attempt to
empathize with the prisoner, i.e., to see the prison through the prisoner's
eyes. With an impact-based test, judge and juror can be made to think:
"How would it be for me to live in conditions like that? Those conditions
are appalling." If the judge and juror can feel the prison as lived by the
prisoner, there is some chance that intolerable conditions or conduct will
be found to be cruel and unusual.
In contrast, an intent-based test reinforces what judge and juror are
naturally inclined to do anyway: identify with the prison employees (who
are like them) and see the prison through their eyes. Judge and juror are
likely to think: "That could be me in that job. It's hard, and the
administration and guards are doing the best they can." When prison is
viewed in this context-as a scary, chaotic place inhabited by sinister and
violent "others," underfunded and understaffed-even the worst conditions
and conduct are unlikely to be found cruel and unusual.
Put another way, both the intent-based and impact-based tests are
designed to put the fact-finder in another person's shoes; the crucial
difference is whose. An intent-based test, which internalizes the
perspective of the prison employees, cannot possibly be expected to
measure whether conditions and conduct violate constitutional
requirements. Only an impact-based test, which situates the factfinder
with the prisoner, can meet this challenge.
The Court has gone seriously astray in imposing an intent-based
requirement in Eighth Amendment cases involving conditions of
confinement. To understand why this shift has occurred, it is necessary
to examine Estelle v. Gamble,' the case in which the intent-based standard
of "deliberate indifference" was introduced. Estelle is the bridge between
the Court's older cases involving modes of punishment and the more
recent cases involving conditions of confinement. As will be seen in the
following section, in Estelle the Court confused and merged two distinct
strands of precedent; it is this confusion that has led to the present-day
reliance upon considerations of intent. An untangling of this analysis is
required if sound and workable standards for evaluating prison conditions
are to be developed.
66. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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IV. A RE-EXAMINATION OF ESTELLE V. GAMBLE
The Court's application of the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions
began in 1976, with Estelle v. Gamble.67 Estelle involved a prisoner's
complaint that the prison had failed to provide him with adequate medical
care after he sustained a back injury.6' The prisoner's pro se complaint
had been dismissed by the district court.69 Apparently, the district court
had thought it so clear that an allegation of inadequate medical care did not
state a cause of action Under the Eighth Amendment that the court had not
even notified the defendants of the complaint, let alone required them to
submit responsive pleadings.7' The court of appeals reversed and
reinstated the complaint; the Supreme Court thereafter granted the
defendants' certiorari petition.7" Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
held that a denial of medical care amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
where the prison medical staff, guards, or other prison employees have
acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs.72
Justice Marshall articulated the standard that, for 20 years, has
remained the means for determining whether inadequate medical care
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle's historical significance,
however, is that it established the principle that prison conditions can
amount to cruel and unusual punishment. This conclusion, which is taken
as a given today, was reached through an ingenious analytical route.
Justice Marshall's majority opinion reviewed the Court's prior cases
interpreting the Eighth Amendment and concluded that the Eighth
Amendment had historically barred inhuman techniques of punishment or
punishment which causes unnecessary suffering.73 Justice Marshall
focused particularly on the 1890 case of In re Kemmler, in which the
Court concluded that "[plunishments are cruel when they involve torture
67. Id.
68. See id. at 98.
69. See id. at 99.
70. See id. at 98 n.2.
71. See id. at 98.
72. See id. at 104. Justice Marshall noted: "This is true whether the indifference is manifested
by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed."
Id. at 104-05 (notes omitted). On the facts presented, however, the prisoner's complaint failed to show
that the medical staff had been more than negligent; the complaint therefore failed to state a cause of
action under the Eighth Amendment against the medical staff. See id. at 107-08. The Court remanded
the case to the court of appeals with respect to the claims against the prison administration. See id.
at 108.
73. See id. at 102-03.
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or lingering death."74  Thus, Justice Marshall, in analyzing the
requirements of the Eighth Amendment, found that prior cases had been
decided primarily on the basis of impact-based considerations, particularly
the extent of pain and suffering experienced by the prisoner.75 Justice
Marshall then articulated the crucial link between the older cases and the
case before him: "In the worst cases a failure to treat a prisoner's medical
needs may actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering death,' . . . the
evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment." 76
Justice Marshall's analysis, therefore, rested upon a simple but powerful
idea: for a prisoner, a denial of medical care may feel like torture or
lingering death. 77  The metaphor at the heart of Justice Marshall's
analysis-lack of medical care as torture or lingering death-is purely
impact-based. 78  Denial of medical care is the equivalent of more
traditional forms of cruel and unusual punishment, because of the similar
impact upon the prisoner. The metaphor is, therefore, the theoretical basis
for bringing all prison conditions within the scope of the Eighth
Amendment: if the conditions are serious enough to be experienced in the
same way as traditionally prohibited forms of punishment, the conditions
are cruel and unusual.
However, having meticulously and persuasively laid out an impact-
based theory for determining that a denial of medical care may amount to
cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Marshall paradoxically used an
intent-based standard-deliberate indifference-to decide the case.79
Justice Marshall examined the facts of the case entirely in terms of intent,
focusing upon the attempts of the medical staff to treat the prisoner and
concluding that the medical staff had been, at worst, negligent.80 Had
Justice Marshall pursued his impact-based analysis, he would instead have
concentrated upon the severity of the prisoner's pain to determine whether
the prisoner had experienced the equivalent of "torture or lingering death."
The Estelle opinion suffers from a fundamental inconsistency in its
internal reasoning. In order to bring the denial of medical care within the
reach of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments, and to find a link with precedent, the Court employed an
74. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1980).
75. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
76. Id. at 103 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447).
77. See id. at 103.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 104.
80. See id. at 107. As indicated earlier, the Court remanded the case for a determination of
the culpability of the prison officials. See supra note 72.
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impact-based metaphor: lack of medical care as torture or lingering
death.8 The experience of being denied medical care feels to the prisoner
like, and is therefore equivalent to, "torture or lingering death," which the
earlier cases had found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
However, the Court then turned around and decided the case under an
intent-based standard: deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.'
The source of the tension in the Court's analysis between
considerations of impact and intent can be found in a seemingly
unremarkable portion of the Estelle opinion. In addition to holding that
a denial of medical care may amount to cruel and unusual punishment,
Justice Marshall discussed a prison's duty to provide medical care to
prisoners. 83 In locating that duty, Justice Marshall relied on what he
termed the "common-law view" that "it is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation
of his liberty, care for himself."' In other words, once the government
takes an individual into custody, the government assumes a duty to provide
the individual with those necessities which the individual, because of
incarceration, is otherwise unable to obtain. Justice Marshall concluded
that this duty to keep a prisoner free from harm includes a responsibility
to provide for the prisoner's medical needs.'
This part of the Court's opinion initially appears unexceptional; even
in 1976, the proposition that prisons were responsible for providing some
degree of medical care was widely accepted.' But there is a hidden
problem: the duty of care derives not from the state's power to punish, but
rather from the state's power to take into custody. The prison's duty to
care for its prisoners is, therefore, grounded in notions of substantive due
process, rather than in the Eighth Amendment. This distinction has
tremendous significance because two entirely different historical strands of
analysis are involved. 87
The duty of care derived from the state's power to take into custody
has a history which is different from, yet parallel to, that of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. The principle that the government has a duty
to care for prisoners is one of long-standing, dating back at least to the
81. See id. at 103.
82. See id. at 103-04.
83. See id.
84. Id. (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
85. See id. at 104-05.
86. See id. at 104-05 n.10-12 (listing cases involving findings of inadequate medical care).
87. With respect to punishment, the older cases interpreting and applying the Eighth
Amendment are discussed in Section I, supra.
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1892 case of Logan v. United States.'s Significantly, in Logan the duty
was framed, not in terms of the state's punitive powers, but rather in terms
of its custodial powers:
The United States, having the absolute right to hold such prisoners,
have an equal duty to protect them, while so held, against assault or
injury from any quarter. The existence of that duty on the part of the
government necessarily implies a corresponding right of the prisoners
to be so protected; and this right of the prisoners is a right secured to
them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.A9
This duty of care arises, then, from the government's custodial relationship
to its prisoners, and is grounded in principles of substantive due process.
Unlike the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments, the custodial duty of care extends beyond incarceration to
other custodial contexts such as mental hospitals'" and, perhaps, residential
foster care facilities and foster homes. 9'
The Court's most recent, extensive discussion of the duty of care
occurred in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services.' There, a suit was brought on behalf of a child who had been
seriously abused by his father.93 The suit alleged that, because the state
child welfare officials had known of the abuse but had failed to protect the
child, the state had violated the child's substantive due process rights.' In
rejecting the claim, the Court held that the state had owed the child no
constitutional duty because the child had not been in the state's custody. 9
The Court explained that such a duty to protect an individual from harm
88. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263,284 (1892). This principle was reaffirmed in Coffin
v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
89. Logan, 144 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added).
90. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding state has duty to provide
reasonable safety for residents and personnel of institution).
91. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), left open the
question of whether a "special relationship" duty of care exists between the state and foster children
placed in the state's custody in foster homes or child care institutions. See infra notes 92-97 and
accompanying text. A number of lower courts have found that a duty of care exists in such cases.
See, e.g., Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993); Meader v.
Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990); K.H.
v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Ledbetter v. Taylor, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709
F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
92. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
93. See id. at 193.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 201.
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exists only where the government has a special relationship with the
individual.96 Such a special relationship has been found to exist only in
situations where the government has assumed custody over the individual.'9
Thus, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments and the substantive due process duty to care for and protect
those within government custody are distinct constitutional requirements
with different histories. The duty to provide prisoners with medical care
recognized in Estelle is, therefore, rooted not in the Eighth Amendment,
but in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Under this analysis, Estelle is not about punishment and should not have
been decided as an Eighth Amendment case.
The flaw in the Estelle opinion is that it merged these two distinct
constitutional concepts and created confusion which, as discussed earlier,
has continued to the present. This conclusion does not, however,
invalidate all of the reasoning in Estelle or require that twenty years of
cases that have followed and relied upon Estelle be discarded. Rather, it
requires that courts distinguish circumstances involving punishment, and
implicating the Eighth Amendment, from those that are custodial, and
encompassed within the due process duty of care. Aspects of incarceration
that involve punishment are properly evaluated under the Eighth
Amendment, using an impact-based standard drawn from the Estelle
Court's "torture or lingering death" metaphor.9" In contrast, custodial
aspects of incarceration should be evaluated under Estelle's intent-based
"deliberate indifference" standard to determine whether the duty of care
has been breached. 99
96. See id.
97. See id. The Court noted that there are only limited circumstances under which "the
Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection . . . to particular
individuals." Id. at 198. These are custodial situations:
[When the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his
safety and general well-being .... The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the
State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.
Id. at 199-200.
98. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). As in the older Eighth Amendment
cases, the critical consideration will be the severity of the actions or conditions at issue, rather than
the intent of the officials. As for the content of this standard, one plausible approach was suggested
by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 371 (1986).
Justice Marshall would have used expert opinions and studies about prison conditions as the measure
of acceptable societal standards. See id. at 371 n:4; see also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying
text.
99. The constitutional duty of care, premised on the existence of a "special relationship," is
similar to a tort duty, the breach of which is determined by analyzing the alleged tortfeasor's state of
mind. It is therefore appropriate to focus upon a prison official's state of mind to determine whether
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What remains is to define a workable distinction between the punitive
and custodial qualities of imprisonment, a task which admittedly will often
be difficult. "0 The concluding section represents an attempt to do this.
CONCLUSION
Attempting to untangle Estelle's threads of reasoning is not easy, for
the boundaries between the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments and the government's substantive due process
duty of custodial care are far from clear. Two trends in modern society
have made it especially difficult to draw this distinction.
The first of these trends is that prisons, as they are increasingly
forced to assume responsibilities and perform functions that were
historically beyond their scope, are becoming more like other residential
institutions. This has occurred in at least three ways. First, the high
incidence of infectious and deadly diseases-particularly AIDS and
tuberculosis-in impoverished communities has had a severe impact upon
prison populations.10' This has created the need for sophisticated medical
and respite care within prisons.0 2 Second, increasing sentence lengths
the due process duty of care has been violated. While it might be argued that an objective standard
of gross negligence, or even simple negligence, should be sufficient to establish a due process
violation, the Court has required a higher showing of culpability on the part of prison officials.
The deliberate indifference test is essentially equivalent to a recklessness standard. In Farmer
v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the Court discussed the distinction between "civil-law" and
"criminal law" recklessness. The former charges the actor with constructive knowledge of an obvious,
unreasonable risk, while the latter requires proof of actual knowledge. See id. at 1979. The Court
adopted the criminal law definition in holding that "deliberate indifference" is a subjective standard.
See id. at 1980.
100. Justice White suggested an alternative approach in his concurring opinion in Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 306-11 (1991). Justice White would have distinguished between system-wide
conditions and "challenges to specific acts or omissions directed at individual prisoners" and would
have limited the use of an intent standard to the latter context. Id. at 309. However, Justice Scalia
disposed of this approach by arguing persuasively that the question of when a deprivation amounts to
a "condition of confinement" should not depend on the number of prisoners who are affected by the
deprivation. See id. at 299 n.1.
101. Perhaps the most chilling measure of the extent of the AIDS epidemic in prisons is that
in 1994, AIDS-related factors accounted for 35 percent of all deaths in state prisons. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HIV IN PRISONS 1994,
Table 4, "AIDS-related deaths of sentenced prisoners under State jurisdiction, 1994" (March 1996).
In the Northeast 53 percent of the deaths were AIDS-related, and in Connecticut and New York, three-
fifths of the deaths were AIDS-related. See id.
102. The prevalence of HIV has placed unprecedented demands upon prisons. See Kathleen
Knepper, Responsibility of Correctional Officials in Responding to the Incidence of the HIV Virus in
Jails and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 45 (Winter 1995) (recommending
a comprehensive program of HIV training, education, care, and treatment); Kathy Boudin & Judy
Clark, A Community of Women Organize Themselves to Cope with the AIDS Crisis: A Case Study from
Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 47 (1991) (describing a program of
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have yielded a "graying" prison population that requires a variety of
geriatric services. 03 Third, the dramatic increase in the number of women
being incarcerated has forced prisons to confront an array of parenting
issues. 1° In short, prisons are being asked to take on the medical and
peer support and counseling organized and administered by the prisoners themselves); NAT'LCOMM'N
ON AIDS, REP. No. 4, HIV DISEASE IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1990) (recommending programs
of prevention and treatment, recruitment of trained health care providers, clinical drug trials, family
social services and reproductive counseling, and staff training on confidentiality).
The AIDS epidemic has occurred at the same time as a resurgence of tuberculosis, and in
combination, the HIV and tuberculosis epidemics have created a health care crisis for prisons. See
Prevention and Control of Tuberculosis in Correctional Institutions: Recommendations, Advisory
Committee for Elimination of Tuberculosis, 262 JAMA 3258-60 (1989) (outlining a program of
surveillance, containment, and assessment involving skin testing of prisoners and staff; chest
radiographs; sputum smears and culture examinations; isolation of prisoners with suspected or
confirmed tuberculosis in a housing area with separate ventilation, negative air pressure in relation to
adjacent areas and four to six room air exchanges per hour; installation of ultraviolet lights; closely
monitored administration of medication; record systems for tracking and assessing prisoners with TB;
and medical training of correctional institution staff); see also Andrew Skolnick, Government Issues
Guidelines to Stem Rising Tuberculosis Rates in Prisons, 262 JAMA 3249 (1989) (outlining the Center
for Disease Control's recommendations for the prevention and control of tuberculosis among prison
populations).
103. See Wilbert Rideau, Dying in Prison, in LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL BEHIND
BARS 158-178 (Wilbert Rideau & Ron Wikberg eds., 1992); George M. Anderson, Growing Old
Behind Bars, AMERICA, July 2, 1994, at 13-15; Judy C. Anderson & R. Daniel McGehee, South
Carolina Strives to Treat Elderly and Disabled Offenders, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 1991, at 124,
126-27.
104. Although statistics concerning the number of prisoners who are parents of minor children
are imprecise and not entirely reliable, some information is available. In 1991, 66.6 percent of the
state women prisoners in the United States had at least one child under the age of eighteen, and 62.6
percent of those women had more than one child. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REP., WOMEN IN PRISON, Table 9 (1991). Fifty-
six point one percent of men prisoners had children under the age of eighteen. See id.
The profound impact of separation upon families of incarcerated parents, and particularly
mothers, is illustrated by the fact that, in 1986, 85 percent of the mothers of minor children had legal
custody of their children before entering prison, and 78 percent of the mothers lived with their children
at that time. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REP., WOMEN IN PRISON, Table 13 (1986). Furthermore, more than 85 percent
of the incarcerated mothers intended to resume custody after their release from prison. See id.
Among men, approximately one-half of the fathers of minor children had lived with their children prior
to their imprisonment, and an almost equal number planned to live with their children after their
release. See id.
A number of commentators have discussed the necessity of providing services within prisons
to incarcerated parents and their children in order to preserve the family relationships. See McGowan
& Blumenthal, Why Punish the Children? A Study of Children of Women Prisoners, NAT'L COUNCIL
ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (1978). Eighteen years after its publication, this study remains the most
powerful piece about the importance of the bonds between children and their incarcerated parents. The
study concludes with a number of policy suggestions. See Adela Beckerman, Incarcerated Mothers
and Their Children in Foster Care: The Dilemma of Visitation, 11 CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERV. REV.
175 (1989); Creasie Finney Hariston & Hess, Family Ties: Maintaining Child-Parent Bonds is
Important, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 1989, at 102; Hale, The Impact of Mothers' Incarceration on
the Family System: Research and Recommendations, 12 MARRIAGE AND FAM. REV. 143 (1987);
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social work responsibilities traditionally borne by hospitals, nursing
homes, day care centers, and social services agencies.
These changes in the role of prisons have occurred at the same time
as another significant social trend: the increasing institutionalization of
daily life. In the modern industrial world, daily life occurs within, and is
ordered by, a variety of institutional settings, from the school to the work
place. Michael Foucault described this institutional structuring as
"discipline" and argued further that prison is not distinct from, but is
rather on a continuum with, other disciplinary institutions. 5 A common
feature of factories, offices, schools, residential child care facilities,
military bases, mental hospitals, and prisons is that they all classify and
regulate individuals, albeit for differing reasons and through varying
degrees of coercion and behavior modification techniques.
Florence W. Kaslow, Couples or Family Therapy for Prisoners and Their Significant Others, 15 AM.
J. FAM. THERAPY 352 (1987); Ariela Lowenstein, Temporary Single Parenthood-The Case of
Prisoners' Families, FAM. RELATIONS, Jan. 1986, at 79, 84; Dorothy Driscoll, Mother's Day Once
a Month, 47 CORRECTIONS TODAY 18 (1985); William H. Sack et al., The Children of Imprisoned
Parents: A Psychosocial Exploration, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 618, 621-27 (1976); Comment,
The Prisoner-Mother and Her Child, I CAP. U. L. REV. 127 (1972).
For a comprehensive treatment of the subject of incarcerated parents and their children, see
KATHERINE GABEL & DENISE JOHNSTON, CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS (1995). See also
Philip M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents in Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757 (1991-1992).
Related to issues of parenting are questions of reproductive rights. See Susan Stefan, Whose
Egg Is It Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized and Incompetent Women, 13
NOVA L. REV. 455 (Spring 1989); Jaqueline B. Deoliveira, Note, Marriage, Procreation and the
Prisoner: Should Reproductive Alternatives Survive During Incarceration?, 5 TOURO L. REV. 189
(1988); Mary V. Deck, Note, Incarcerated Mothers and Their Infants: Separation or Legislation?, 29
B.C. L. REV. 689 (May 1988).
105. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT 137-38, 1979. Foucaultdescribed
"discipline" as follows:
[Miethods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body,
which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of
docility-utility, might be called 'disciplines.' Many disciplinary methods had long been
in existence-in monasteries, armies, workshops. But in the course of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries the disciplines became general formulas of domination.... The
historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was
born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of
its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it
more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed
was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its
elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of
power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A 'political anatomy,' which
was also a 'mechanics of power,' was being born; it defined how one may have a hold
over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may
operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one
determines.
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Thus, at the same time that prisons have been forced to assume more
of a "caring" role on behalf of ill and aging prisoners and those who are
parents, society as a whole has become increasingly institutionalized.
These two trends have increased the difficulty of distinguishing between
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments and the duty of care:
if all "disciplinary" institutions are essentially variations of a method of
ordering society, then how are we to distinguish prisons from other such
institutions? More to the point, how are we to differentiate between the
right to be free from "punishment" that is cruel and unusual, and the duty
that all institutions owe to provide some amount of protection to the
individuals within them?' °
In order to answer these questions and make these distinctions, it is
necessary to determine what gives prisons their uniqueness. Those
qualities that are unique to prisons are "punitive" and therefore subject to
the Eighth Amendment; those attributes common to all residential
institutions are "custodial" and encompassed within the duty of care.
What, then, makes an institution a prison, rather than something else?
While many residential institutions have common features, the essence of
a prison is the prisoner's relationship to the cell (and the surrounding
cellblock) and the prison guard, for it is in the cell and through the guards
that punishment is carried out by the prison and experienced by the
prisoner. All residential institutions have rooms of varying levels of
restrictiveness, but only prisons have cellblocks, i.e., space that by its very
design is meant to remind a prisoner that she or he is an enemy of, and
outcast from, society. Bars, open toilets which are sometimes controlled
from the outside of the cell, bare bunks, tiers of cells connected by narrow
catwalks, all subject to constant surveillance, bleak solitary confinement,
units stripped of even the most basic amenities-these are stark and
constant reminders of who the prisoner is and what she or he has done.
In other institutions, some attempt is made to make the residents feel that
their living space is their "home,"" °7 but in the prison, the cell and the
106. What is meant here is not just the previously discussed constitutional duty of care, but a
more general duty that is sometimes grounded in common law tort principles and sometimes codified,
for example, in workplace safety regulations. This is the duty to protect designated classes of
individuals from harm, and in some cases, to provide for their general well-being. It is the duty that
employers owe to employees, schools owe to students, and mental hospitals owe to patients.
107. This is not to suggest that institutions like mental hospitals are generally cheery places.
However, much of the drabness associated with such institutions has more to do with lack of resources
than design. When resources are not so limited, as in a well-endowed private mental hospital, attempts
are made to create a positive physical environment.
Another way to describe this idea is to conceive of what various residential institutions would
choose to do if they had unlimited financial resources. While hospitals would be expected to design
aesthetically pleasing physical facilities, intended to provide residents with air, light, comfort, and
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cellblock cannot provide any such comfort; they must be as far removed
from "home" as possible.
Similarly, while other institutions have security staff, prison guards
are a breed apart. As is true of the cell, the role of a prison guard is to
create and reinforce an atmosphere of oppressiveness." °8 One prison
author has painted a graphic picture of the way in which prisoners may
experience prison guards:
The guards do not speak to you. You are cattle without the faculty of
reason. I have been pointed in the direction of a place across the floor
or the exercise cage and given a push to get me to walk there because
the guards, in their contempt, will not acknowledge that a prisoner can
understand reason.
I have never seen an indifferent [guard]. I have seen lazy and
unconcerned [guards], but never an objective and indifferent [guard].
The lazy ones are like magnanimous kings who carelessly overlook
"slights" and arbitrarily pass out "mercies," but will, at a whim,
suddenly rise up angry and take it all back, relegating everyone to hell.
Always, always every guard in prison is a tyrant, and prisoners are
his subjects.
* . . Among themselves, the guards are human. Among themselves,
the prisoners are human. Yet between these two the relationship is not
human. It is animal.... It would seem to be an irony, but it is not:
prisoners do not make guards to be what they are. Neither does society
in general. The state does. It gives them arbitrary power over
prisoners. They embrace it as a way of life. That is the source of their
evil .. . .09
privacy, one would not expect this of prisons. In fact, recent experience suggests precisely the
opposite: the most expensive modem facilities are the "supermaxes," high security prisons in
California, Ohio, and Colorado whose physical space seems to have been designed specifically to
demoralize the prisoners by creating the bleakest and most punitive environment possible. See, e.g.,
Craig Haney, "Infamous Punishment": The Psychological Consequences of Isolation, NAT'L PRISON
PROJECT J., at 3 (Spring 1993) (discussing the Pelican Bay State Prison in California).
108. A qualification must be made here. The above comments are not meant to describe the
persons who become guards, but, rather, the institutional role these individuals assume as guards. This
distinction is made most vividly in the infamous "Zimbardo Experiment" in which "normal" volunteer
male college students were randomly divided into the roles of prisoner and guard in a simulated prison.
See Craig Haney et al., "Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison," INT'L J. OF CRIMINOLOGY
AND PENOLOGY, 69-97 (1973) (describing the experiment in detail). Within only a few days, the
"guards" began to exhibit aggressive and sadistic behavior toward the "prisoners." See id. at 93-94.
109. JACK HENRY ABBOT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON 55-61 (1991).
Throughout the book Abbott uses the term "pig" to describe guards. See id.
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No other institution can replicate this profoundly intense relationship of
prisoner to guard."0
If, then, the' cellblock and the prison guard are seen as the
distinguishing features of prison, it is these features, and the relationship
of the prisoner to them, that define "punishment" for Eighth Amendment
purposes. Under this approach, issues actionable under the Eighth
Amendment would include overcrowding or, at the other extreme, severe
isolation and accompanying deprivations of basic necessities such as food
and light, as well as allegations of guard brutality and similar
misconduct. "'
As discussed above, such Eighth Amendment cases would be decided
under a test focusing upon the impact of the conditions at issue upon the
prisoner. Intent would be irrelevant; deplorable physical conditions could
not be excused on fiscal grounds or good faith defenses. Similarly, in
cases involving allegations of guard brutality, the inquiry would center on
the way the guard's conduct was experienced by the prisoner; actual intent
would no longer have to be proven."'
110. As with cells, the distinctively punitive quality of prison guards can be seen by imagining
how different institutions might behave if they had unlimited resources. Where one would expect
mental hospitals to recruit individuals with specialized mental health training and sensitivity to the
needs of patients, and foster care facilities to hire credentialed social work professionals, it is doubtful
that prisons would alter the profile of their guards by, for example, bringing in individuals with
criminology degrees and a commitment to rehabilitative goals.
111. This analysis would eliminate the distinction in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
between pre-trial jail detention and post-conviction prison confinement. Because jails share the
essential attributes of prisons, many jail conditions are "punitive" rather than "custodial." Jail
conditions relating to cellblock conditions and guard brutality would, therefore, be evaluated under the
Eighth Amendment, using an impact-based standard.
Although this would be a departure from the pre-conviction/post-conviction distinction
underlying Bell, there is no logical reason to treat jails and prisons differently. As Justice Marshall
argued in his Bell dissent, "in terms of the nature of the imposition and the impact on detainees,
pretrial incarceration . . . is essentially indistinguishable from punishment [by imprisonment]." Id.
at 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In their physical design and staffing, prisons and jails are virtually
identical. Moreover, most jails currently house a mixed population comprising both pre-trial detainees
and individuals who have been convicted of crimes. This latter group includes individuals serving
misdemeanor time, those convicted of felonies who are awaiting transportation to prisons, and parole
violators. Indeed, pre-trial detainees currently account for only slightly more than half of the national
jail population. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, Table 6.15, "Conviction Status of Adult Jail Inmates" (1994).
112. The key consideration would be the felt purpose of the guard's actions. This is a subtle,
but significant variation of the Whitley/Hudson approach. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanyng
text. In Hudson, Justice O'Connor justified a per se rule in which all sadistic and malicious guard
conduct is unconstitutional regardless of the harm the prisoner has actually suffered by asserting that
"society" finds such conduct intolerable in and of itself. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1992). One can agree with this reasoning, but see the conduct as an issue not of intent, but of impact.
Sadistic and malicious guard conduct does not occur in a vacuum; it has to be experienced by the
prisoner. What, therefore, gives the conduct its unconstitutional quality is not the guard's state of
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Other types of prison condition cases would be governed by the duty
of custodial care. Issues of medical care and physical safety, which arise
in all government-run residential institutions, would not be evaluated as
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, but would instead be analyzed
as substantive due process claims. The test for evaluating such cases
would be the primarily intent-based "deliberate indifference" standard,
which, as discussed earlier, is appropriate in such contexts. Whether
medical care is adequate will depend in large part on what information the
medical staff had before it and what actions the staff took in response.
Similarly, allegations that the prison staff has failed to adequately protect
a prisoner from assault by another prisoner cannot be meaningfully
assessed without first determining what the prison staff knew about the
potential danger to the assaulted prisoner. Admittedly, not all cases
arising in the prison setting will divide neatly into the categories suggested
above: on the one hand, cases involving cellblock conditions and guard
brutality as "punishment" to be evaluated under the Eighth Amendment,
and on the other hand, cases involving issues such as inadequate medical
care and failure to protect from assault as "custodial" claims to be decided
under the duty of care. However, on a practical level, this approach
would, at the very least, provide a workable distinction between cases
involving overcrowding and those involving a denial of medical care, two
of the most frequently litigated types of prison cases.
Estelle v. Gamble was a pathbreaking, if flawed, case that held out
two promises: to give the Eighth Amendment meaning and vitality for
modern prisoners; and to take an expansive and humane view of the
government's duty to those who are within its custody and, therefore,
completely dependent upon it for all of their basic needs. Only by
revisiting Estelle and clarifying its historical and analytical underpinnings
can these promises be given effect.
mind, but the way in which the prisoner experiences the guard's behavior when the guard is acting
maliciously and sadistically. That experience is harmful, even in the absence of serious physical
injuries, and it is for that reason that no additional showing of physical injury is required.
This view of guard misconduct as being especially reprehensible to society is similar to the
analysis used by the Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). There, the plaintiffs were found
to have a constitutional cause of action for police misconduct, in addition to existing state tort
remedies. See id. at 192. The principle underlying the Court's holding is that a citizen experiences
a special degree of harm when the harm results from the "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."
Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A citizen's experience of such misconduct is much worse than that of similar misconduct
on the part of another private citizen. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 193-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
This is one rationale offered to justify the imposition of enhanced criminal sanctions for bias-
related crimes.
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